Introduction: The Puzzle -law making by law breaking
Recent cases of non-compliance with judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) raise several profound questions of legitimacy. Some states seem simply unwilling to defer to the ECtHR, putting their own legitimacy on the line. Other cases, such as the Hirst v. UK case of prisoners' voting rights, seem to challenge the legitimacy of the Court or aspects of its practices.
2 May some such non-compliance with international courts in fact be justifiable? The present chapter argues that some forms of parliamentary disobedience may be understood and assessed not only as protest and avoidance, but also as a constructive mode of correcting the law making of the ECtHR. Under some conditions, certain forms of domestic parliamentary disobedience should be considered as and accepted as an extreme form of multi-level law making.
A central normative challenge for international courts (ICs) is that they risk replacing the rule of law with the rule of lawyers. The IC must be sufficiently independent of the state parties to the disputes, and still remain sufficiently accountable. This design question arises not only when ICs adjudicate, but even more so when they embark on dynamic interpretations of international law. Such law making is even more necessary in areas of international law than in domestic law, since the negotiated treaties, 'general principles' and 'customary international law' are vague, often deliberately left indeterminate by the negotiating state -2 -parties. This law making function further fuels the 'countermajoritarian' criticism against ICs' override of democratically accountable legislatures. To some extent such review might be defended as a self-imposed constraint states undertake to secure similar self-binding by other states, or to bolster their credibility among important constituencies -be it investors or their own citizens. But such arguments are strained when ICs engage in necessary but contested treaty interpretation, even when warranted by the object and purpose of the treaty. 3 Surely there must be some limits to such interpretation: presumably some interpretations are mistaken. Theories of legitimacy typically hold that the point of having an authority is that it pre-empts the subjects' other reasons to act and thus prohibits the subjects from acting in every case on their own assessment. 4 Yet the most convincing legitimacy theories only argue that such pre-emption goes up to a certain point: beyond some limits a particular IC may lack legitimate authority -and in some such cases, non-compliance may be justified.
5
There must therefore be ways to check and guide ICs' interpretations if their authority is to be legitimate. The present multi-level legal system not only hinders such checks, but increases the need for them. The ICs' law making is both more necessary and less checked than their domestic counterparts'. No international legislator can correct ICs' interpretations by revising treaties with procedures reminiscent of how legal acts or constitutions are modified by domestic legislatures. Treaty changes are often far more cumbersome than domestic legislative or even constitutional changes. A 'conference of the parties' may allow for some changes without formal amendments, 6 otherwise unanimity or at least consensus among most states is required for treaty change.
There are few procedures to challenge or correct ICs' interpretation of customary international law or general principles of international law. And the risks are high that a state will protest a particular interpretation largely because the interpretation is contrary to its interests. Such risks are especially high in international human rights law cases. interpretation and law making.
Varieties of non-compliance distinguished
This article explores and defends one response to this challenge: domestic legislators may deliberately disobey an IC, the ECtHR in particular, in an ultimate effort to correct its interpretation or application of international law. Such non-compliance has received some academic attention, and must be distinguished from other forms.
7
That domestic parliaments, executives or judiciaries sometimes choose to disobey decisions that go against them should come as no surprise, especially when cooperation is costly and sanctions are scarce. 8 Yet states often defer to international law and to judgments of international courts (ICs) in general and to human rights courts in particular -but not always.
Some such noncompliance may simply be disobedience which cannot be justified.
Often it may be difficult to determine whether there is noncompliance: national judges will consider the ECtHR's case law, but find ways to distinguish the case at hand and claim that they are nonetheless complying. 9 Sometimes the noncompliance may be an extreme mode of protest to voice displeasure.
10 Some noncompliance appears largely as claims to be exempt from a generally accepted rule -without any claim that the rule itself should change. The second kind of case arises when domestic judges and scholars allow for judicial non-compliance. 13 The 'Solange' judgments of the German Federal Constitutional Court may be taken to express this -not against a human rights IC but with regard to human rights, against the Court of Justice of the European Union. 14 The German Constitutional
Court also refused to comply with an ECtHR judgment due to concern for other affected parties than those involved in the case, with a justification the German Constitutional
Court has repeated in later cases:
The Basic Law aims to integrate Germany into the legal community of peaceful and free states, but does not waive the sovereignty contained in the last instance in the German constitution. There is therefore no contradiction with the aim of commitment to international law if the legislature, exceptionally, does not comply with the law of international agreements, provided this is the only way in which a violation of fundamental principles of the constitution can be averted.
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In the UK Lord Manc has likewise not ruled out disobedience with rulings by the ECtHR, but he underscores that It would then have to involve some truly fundamental principle of our law or some most egregious oversight or misunderstanding before it could be appropriate for this The concern here, however, is not the multi-level check of ICs by domestic courts, but rather by domestic parliaments. The relevant cases are then where the domestic parliament seriously considers non-compliance with a particular decision by a human rights IC. The justification is not only that this judgment violates the domestic constitution, but that the IC's interpretation of the treaty, or the treaty itself, should be modified. Parliament may then be seen as seeking to change the interpretation or application of the legal norms as an extraordinary 'dialogue' with the IC.
-6 - On the other hand, illegal protests against international and regional human rights courts appear especially threatening to the legitimacy of these courts. A main function of these ICs is to allow states to increase their credibility when they claim that they are committed to human rights. Non-compliance may question that state's commitment, and may also damage the credibility of the ECtHR as a commitment device for other states -especially if the human rights credentials of the protesting state is otherwise not in doubt.
The nature of injustice to be corrected
Which sorts of corrections may parliaments be urging through non-compliance? The ECtHR's judgments will either find a violation by the state, or find no violation. If a parliament thus believes that the Court makes a mistake in a case against its own state, it is likely to either concern the interpretation of a Convention right, or the Court's 'balancing' of conflicting such signalling seems exceptionally difficult in the international arena.
I submit that we can bring some light on the issues by understanding these acts as a form of civil disobedience. We can of course not merely transpose sound theories of civil disobedience from domestic settings onto these matters of international law. 24 The nature of the international legal system affects these standards and criteria in ways that should affect how parliaments should select and present their noncompliance, and how other bodies should respond to such non-compliance. These differences notwithstanding, John Rawls' theory of civil disobedience is particularly helpful. 26 This is one of the most influential accounts of civil disobedience -critics notwithstanding. 27 Rawls' account is highly relevant for our concerns because it is developed as part of a broader theory of the justice and legitimacy of state authority -thus closer to our starting point than theories based on premises of anarchism. It recognizes the tension between respecting and reforming law through disobedience -a tension which arguably is even more visible and risky in the case of international law. 28 Rawls' broad framework also helps show that discussions of the legitimacy of international law, and the possible justifiability of violations of international law, are not only murky attempts an manipulation. 29 One important contribution in this regard is the distinction this theory draws between defining criteria of civil disobedience and justificatory criteria. The theory thus recognizes that there may be acts of civil disobedience that are normatively unjustified. 30 The theory of civil disobedience furthermore considers the justifiability of civil disobedience under circumstances of not fully just legal orders, also highly relevant for our purposes. Furthermore, Rawls' theory places great weight on the public justification required for such illegal acts -a requirement which makes parliaments' role particularly salient. Finally, his theory recognizes the risk that illegal acts may unravel respect for the rule of law in general. This risk is arguably higher for international law than within stable states that benefit from general compliance.
The voluntary nature of treaty obligations may appear to be one important difference to theories of civil disobedience. The latter is developed for issues arising for citizens within a domestic legal order -a legal order which citizens for practical purposes usually cannot avoid. Citizens also bear greater responsibility for domestic injustices insofar as their state wields its power 'in the citizens' name'. In contrast, states can withdraw from a treaty and thus end their international legal obligations, and reduce their moral complicity in the injustice. 31 -9 -defining characteristics and justificatory conditions. Section 3 seeks to identify which acts of noncompliance to ICs may count as equivalent ultimate corrective devices; section 4 explores the conditions for when such acts are justified. Section 5 illustrates these accounts with two partly hypothetical cases: that of Hirst and Animal Defenders, both against the United Kingdom. Section 6 considers how other actors should respond to such acts.
Rawls' theory of civil disobedience
John Rawls' theory of civil disobedience explores an interpretation of the role or 'social function' of civil disobedience as an 'ultimate stabilizing device.' 34 This may be a helpful guide in the debate, both as regards how to define this set of actions, and to determine under which conditions they may be justified.
Wilful noncompliance with the law can be normatively justified for a variety of reasons, not least in less just states. One interesting kind of case is when the protester seeks to appeal to the shared sense of justice of the community -in particular the authorities. The protester seeks to argue that whilst the authorities are generally normatively justified to rule, this particular judgment or policy is so far beyond the limits laid out by that sense of justice that disobedience is warranted. The aim is to correct the flaws of a generally well-functioning legal system -whilst minimizing the risk of its unravelling.
Scope conditions
Rawls is concerned with protests in a nearly just legal and political order. In sufficiently unjust societies there may be no moral requirement to protest in such a 'civilized' way. The society at large including the authorities must have a shared 'sense of justice' in the sense of some commitment to substantive normative principles of justice. And the system must be robust enough to allow actors within the state -such as legislatures, courts or the executiveto seek to correct the flaws of the legal system by specific acts of noncompliance without putting the system as a whole at a risk.
On the basis of this account of civil disobedience, Rawls lays out six defining characteristics and four conditions for such acts to be justified:
D1. The act is contrary to the law D2. The act is conscientious and political -The target is not only something that one's own morality rejects, but something which violates what is taken to be broadly shared principles of 34 Rawls, 'A Theory of Justice', p. 383.
-10 -a 'public justification' of the domestic basic structure of society.
D3. The act is meant to bring about change -not 'merely' an act of conscientious objection seeking exemption, but rather to change the decision.
D4. The act is public -to draw attention to the alleged injustice and promote change.
D5. The act is non-violent. The reason for this requirement is to express and publicly confirm the protester's ultimate commitments to respect for principles of justice.
D6. The agent accepts the consequences -i.e. punishment if given -in order to both make the case public and show general respect for law and the rule of law. Note that it is not a requirement on this account that the civilly disobedient act must be without self-interested motives. Thus women, or minorities, may justifiably protest patriarchal regulations or laws that discriminate against minorities by civil disobedience even though the protesters themselves stand to gain by the changes. Nor is it a requirement of just acts of civil disobedience on this account that they actually succeed in promoting more just rules or institutions. Several premises and ranges of alternatives differ from the domestic setting and scope conditions, but it would appear that several alleged differences are not decisive. To clarify, consider some objections.
A theory of civil disobedience against international courts
Some may challenge the relevance of a theory of civil disobedience to international law. Critics may hold that to speak of civil disobedience may falsely insinuate that the present global order is nearly just. Recall that civil disobedience is here defended as a corrective device for one of few flaws in a nearly just constitutional order system which otherwise merits obedience. Critics may argue that this is a flawed description of the current status of international law. The international legal system may be so unjust that it does not carry much moral authority. The relevant theory is not one of civil disobedience, but of just revolution.
In response, I firstly submit that civil disobedience may also be seen as a corrective device for less just legal orders -though its impact may be less insofar as any shared conception of global justice is weak or non-existent. And the risk of jettisoning the benefits of the current international legal system may be such that the parallels to civil disobedience are A final challenge to applying the framework of civil disobedience to international law is that the intention of law making will be difficult to convey with credibility. A parliament will have more difficulty in convincing other actors of their intention since there is a high risk that noncompliance will be misinterpreted as plain disobedience:
Given the frequency with which governments are believed to shirk compliance with international as compared to domestic law, noncompliance, standing alone, may not be understood as a sanction by jurists or by observers. It may, however, be viewed in this way when used to augment challenges to a tribunal's legitimacy. … As a practical matter, the efficacy of noncompliance as a judicial control mechanism is likely to vary with the state's success in linking these two strategies.
39
One implication may be that states with a stable record of compliance with international law are more likely candidates to credibly commit an act of civil disobedience. Another implication is that a credible public justification for the non-compliance is crucial. A parliamentary debate may provide exactly this.
We now consider the various defining characteristics as they apply to international noncompliance.
D1 The act is contrary to the law
The acts of concern are those where a state admits to act technically in violation of international law. This definition thus excludes several high profiles of noncompliance, for instance if a domestic court claims that a regional or international court has decided a case ultra vires.
D2 The act is conscientious and 'political'
The relevant noncompliance is thus not one where the main concern is 'only' to seek an exemption. Note that the parliament may have mixed motives, but one claim must be that the 39 Helfer and Slaughter, 'Why states create international tribunals', 54.
-14 -judgment or the norm is normatively unacceptable.
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D3 The act is meant to bring about change in the international norm
One objective of the noncompliance must be to have the legal norm or interpretation changed.
Evidence for such objectives may be found in the public nature of the noncompliance, and the reasons given in the parliamentary debates.
41
D4 The act is publicly acknowledged as violating the international obligations of the state
The parliament must admit that it is in fact not complying with its international obligations. It should be clear that parliament is not only preparing a legal appeal, or trying to evade or postpone compliance.
42
D5 The act signals commitment to the underlying values, e.g. by being non-violent
The noncompliance must be limited and consistent with the central norms which the ECtHR is thought to violate in its interpretation or judgment. The noncompliant parliament presumably agrees to these, including a commitment to treat individuals with respect on a footing of equality. Respect for some such constraints helps distinguish such acts from ordinary illegal actions. How might this requirement apply to relevant cases of illegal humanitarian intervention? Presumably, such acts must take extraordinary care to avoid collateral casualties and only resort to violence under strict conditions of proportionality.
D6 The agent accepts the consequences
In the international case, the state must accept the remedies imposed by the ECtHR. 43 However, the civilly disobedient objectives might render the Committee of Ministers more lenient in accepting the state's efforts.
Which such cases of international civil disobedience would be justified?
To fix ideas, consider some possible, partly hypothetical candidate acts of non-compliance with the ECtHR: If the Court were to strike down the Swiss Constitution's prohibition against -15 -minarets which was the outcome of a popular referendum, 44 or if the UK decides to maintain its blanket ban on prisoners' voting. What would be required for such illegal actions to be normatively justifiable acts of international civil disobedience according to this theory? 45 As a backdrop, consider thought-provoking arguments that denounce any noncompliance with international law. Samantha Besson has rejected attempts at revising international law by illegal means:
Those authors' argument is that illegal revisions of international law are justified if they can make international law more legitimate. That idea does not pay sufficient heed, however, to the value of legality of international law, and hence to the normative requirements this value imposes on its law-making processes. These normative requirements inherent in the very legality of international law -together or possibly by contrast to those relative to its procedural or substantive legitimacy -make it counterproductive to hope for the illegal making of international law whatever the urgency of the matter. In the long run, and despite the occurrence of such forms of illegal law-making in current circumstances of international law, international law's legality will be able to consolidate itself only if its law-making processes are organized so as to reflect the very values inherent in the international rule of law.
46
In response, I submit that this overstates the case against international civil disobedience. It may be true that in the long run there should be better law-making processes, thus reducing the need for such illegal corrective attempts. However, given that many argue the need for such illegal acts at the domestic level even for quite well-functioning democracies, it seems unduly optimistic to believe that a better international legislative procedure will ever fully avoid such grave injustices which warrant civil disobedience. Moreover, it appears unduly strict to claim that any illegal act challenges the legitimacy of any piece of international legislation. Until such better legislative processes are in place it seems necessary to allow international civil disobedience as an unfortunate second best.
We then turn to consider the criteria necessary for such acts to be justified. 
J1 The injustice protested must be a clear violation of the appropriate normative
principles
In the domestic setting, Rawls hold that the principles of justice as fairness apply.
For international law, the case may be more difficult to determine due to extensive disagreement concerning such normative principles. Koskenniemi's worry might seem appropriate, that there is no system of shared values internationally. 47 However, the problem is not a general divergence of moral views generally. Thus Dworkin's concern is overdrawn:
The proposition that a sense of moral duty can justify violations of international law threatens to strangle the child.
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The civilly disobedient actors are not only reporting moral unease about a particular case.
Instead they hold that a particular interpretation or norm violates principles of global justice -
and that the interpretation of the norm, or the norm itself should be changed. The claim is thus that there are better norms or patterns of judgments which avoid the problem without creating new ones. Thus individual acts of illegal humanitarian interventions cannot be defended on this model unless they also provide a better set of criteria for when such interventions should be permitted. This is of course not to argue that such interventions may never be justified, but rather that their defence may be different.
Also note that this requirement does not exclude noncompliance in cases which also promote the interests of the state, however defined. In contrast, Francioni's account appears to deem such acts unjustified by his 'Principle of integrity':
the Member State asserting a right to withhold does so in the genuine belief that the challenged decision constitutes a breach of the law and does not act in the pursuit of outcomes that are extraneous or ulterior to the breach or to the situation that has resulted from the breach. In this sense, subjective integrity largely coincides with good faith.
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J2 Normal appeals should have been made and have failed -at least if they are not obviously ineffectual
In the cases of concern here legal efforts to change the perceived unjust international norms or rulings must have been exhausted or appear obviously ineffective. Thus the judgment should have been appealed, and attempts at securing a protocol to change the 47 Koskenniemi, 'Legitimacy', p. 361-2. 48 Dworkin, 'International law', 2013 23. 49 Francioni, 'Multilateralism', 2000, 54.
-17 -treaty or its interpretation should have been considered. 50 Other forms of judicial and institutional dialogue should also have been considered and tried, if deemed at all effective. Thus the domestic parliament should have expressed its concerns, for instance when appealing the decision. 51 Attempts at calling a conference of the parties should have been considered.
The 'dialogue' by the parliament might be highly critical of the ECtHR, including denunciation of this strand of the ICs judgments, questioning the tribunal's reasoning, identifying errors it has committed, or highlighting its abuses of authority. That governments attach importance to such 'delegitimizing' strategies is suggested by the pains they take to denounce objectionable decisions even when they are purely hortatory.
52
J3
The total amount of civil disobedience in the society must be kept within limits, to prevent unravelling of the basic structure as a whole
An act of international civil disobedience is justifiable only if it does not increase the risk of destabilizing a reasonably legitimate international legal order. This is a central worry due to the more precarious nature of international law.
Thus Dworkin warns that 'International law is fragile, still nascent and in critical condition.' 53 So scholars are concerned that any breach of an international obligation can undermine not only the authority of the primary rule breached but also the authority and integrity of the international legal system itself because it undermines the assumption that states must comply with international law.
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A central risk is that a justifiable act of noncompliance will radiate so that other states will feel less constrained. 55 Thus a weighty objection against illegal humanitarian intervention is Iraq. Any doctrine that would allow powerful nations to justify aggressive war as a protection of basic human rights boils with the danger of abuse…. permission to invade without Security Council authorization would prove massively divisive rather than a -18 -principle around which further consensus and salience might develop.
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This is an important consideration. However, it should not be overdrawn. Other forms of non-compliance foster less grave risks, and there are ways to reduce the risk even further. Indeed, an appropriate distinction has to be maintained between the legitimacy of international law and its stabilizing function. Again, it may well be argued that stability is in large part itself a function of legitimacy, and that the civilly disobedient protests of states are a vital resource for increasing the legitimacy of international law through publicizing injustices and facilitating legal reform.
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One implication is that justified international civil disobedience must be publicly justified with great care, to ensure broad understanding of the complaint and the proposed improvement.
Another implication is that such acts of civil disobedience are less likely to be justified early in an IC's life, when it is still building its legitimacy. Early non-compliance, even if otherwise justified, then runs a greater risk of damaging the IC.
J4 Injury of the innocent must be avoided
This criterion seems to hold without significant changes also for the international cases considered here.
Note that these conditions do not limit permissible civil disobedience to generally compliant states, or ones with a high quality of democracy, however measured. The credibility of a state which is a notorious non-complier may be questioned if the parliament engages in yet another violation of an ECtHR judgment but this time claims it is for lawmaking purposes. However, such questionable credibility is not itself decisive. What does matter is mainly the quality of the arguments and the deliberation in the particular case.
Two Cases
Consider now some partly hypothetical cases of noncompliance with the ECtHR's judgments.
To help focus on the pertinent aspects, the cases involve the United Kingdom, which generally complies with the Court's rulings. 56 A central point of the Court's decision is that the lack of good faith reasoning by Parliament removes claims by the UK to benefit from a margin of appreciation -a margin which the Court holds is wide in such cases:
[T]here is no evidence that Parliament has ever sought to weigh the competing interests or to assess the proportionality of a blanket ban on the right of a convicted prisoner to vote….it cannot be said that there was any substantive debate by members of the legislature on the continued justification in light of modern-day penal policy and of current human rights standards for maintaining such a general restriction on the right of prisoners to vote. In this case, parliament and other domestic authorities have paid careful attention to the relevant rights and case law, and referred to the need to regulate political advertising to promote democratic principles. The deliberations had underscored the need to provide political parties with free broadcasts, etc. These public arguments would indicate that such a hypothetical would indeed qualify as civil disobedience; particularly since the UK has arguably exhausted legal alternatives by seeking to change the Court's practice through the Brighton process. The careful arguments would also tend to minimize the risk that the disobedience would radiate unduly.
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How should courts and other central actors respond to acts of international civil disobedience committed by a domestic parliament?
What should the IC do when confronted with such cases of international civil disobedience?
Such policy recommendations may have to hold regardless of whether the act is justified or not, since this is likely to be contested. Rawls suggests that in the domestic setting, courts may find that the act was an unjustified act of civil disobedience, and acknowledge the good intentions by imposing milder punishments. What is an IC such as the ECtHR to do once the Grand Chamber has issued its judgment, and the state disobeys? In the particular case it hardly seems plausible that the IC should reconsider the case -though it might be tempting e.g. to grant such a protesting state a margin of appreciation. Note that this deflecting strategy is somewhat different from an IC avoiding head-on conflicts with powerful states simply to reduce the risk of non-compliance. 66 In the longer run, the Court should seriously consider a change in its interpretation, possibly drawing on the arguments presented by the protesting state.
Other actors are more free to express support or denouncement. In particular, other states and their bodies might chose to neither condemn nor otherwise sanction the illegal act. 67 For instance, the Parliamentary Assembly may vote for an expression in favour of the protesting state's interpretation of the ECHR. 68 The Committee of Ministers may similarly support the state and be charitable in accepting its reparations. On the other hand, the discussions by the Parliamentary Assembly or the Committee of Ministers may well conclude that the noncompliant state is in the wrong, and instead giving public support to the contested doctrine instead of its overturn.
Conclusions
These reflections give rise to some tentative conclusions that go beyond the justifiability of noncompliance with judgments of the ECtHR.
I submit that the brief account above illustrates that it is possible to discuss the legitimacy of acts which are illegal under international law, without falling into the quagmires of subjectivism feared by Koskenniemi and others.
The discussion has also granted that there are risks of a slippery slope of noncompliance and abuse of discretion. However, these are not always overriding 66 K. Alter, 'Delegating to International Courts: Self-Binding vs. Other-Binding Delegation', Law and contemporary problems, 71 (2008), 3776 67 Cogan, 'Noncompliance', 2006, 208-9. 68 Thanks to Alice Donald for suggesting this reaction.
-22 -considerations, and especially not in the cases considered here: they are not simply claiming to be exceptions to existing norms, but rather improvements of existing norms.
The account has indicated that domestic parliaments can serve important purposes in increasing the credibility of the law breaking as sincere attempts at law making. Such potential should not be overdrawn. Parliamentary debates are also crucial arenas for parties to gather votes by means of 'IC-bashing'. There is no reason to believe that such debates will abide by the deliberative ideals of democratic theorists. 69 Paradoxically, ICs that seek to promote well-functioning democratic parliamentarian debates -such as the ECtHR -may thereby also engender opportunities for more justified international civil disobedience. The result of such law breaking by national parliaments may indeed in the shorter term be a less stable international legal order, but such means may be one of the few forms of international law making left to states which seek to promote a more legitimate stable international legal order.
